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Full Spectrum Education for Full Spectrum Operations:
Educating the Army's Junior Captains for Full Spectrum Operations

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Executive Summary

Title: Full Spectrum Education for Full Spectrum Operations: Educating the Army's Junior Captains for Full Spectrum Operations

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Thesis: In order to conduct full spectrum operations, the Army must leverage civilian graduate programs to educate its company grade combat arms officers in fields of study that will support stability operations.

Discussion: This proposal will advocate that the Army must change how it educates its junior captains (specifically combat arms) for the complex and ambiguous battlefields of today and tomorrow. The Army has transformed its doctrine and organizations to support full spectrum operations; however, it has not changed how it educates its junior officers. The Army must accept its role as the U.S. Government's primary nation-building entity. Currently the Army trains its officers the same way it did during the Cold War. The Cold War presented the Army with a simple military problem, and simple problems have existing military solutions. The stability/nation-building operations that the Army currently faces and will continue to face present multiple complex problems, which in many cases have non-military solutions. The complex operational environment of today also requires decentralized full spectrum operations that use mission type orders as its primary command and control methodology. Additionally, these will be coalition/joint/interagency operations conducted in underdeveloped nations that will require the captain to interact with the local population, their cultural mores and their government. These requirements demand small unit operations lead by a mentally agile captain who has been educated for uncertainty. The advent of the information age means that this captain's judgment will be scrutinized instantaneously by his chain of command and the omnipresent global media. If the captain exercises poor judgment it could have strategic consequences for the U.S. Government's national security strategy.

Conclusion: The Army's education system must transform to meet the educational requirements of today's complex operational environment. The institutional Army cannot meet all the educational requirements that this transformation requires. The Army needs to leverage its existing advanced civil schooling program to educate the majority of its combat arms junior captains for the ambiguous environment they will spend the rest of their careers operating in. A graduate degree in the social sciences or hard sciences would broaden the captain's education as well as providing applicable skills for stability operations. This will require a cultural shift in the Army's view of graduate education. For far too long the Army has viewed its people as an overhead expense. If the Army wants to succeed in the complex battlefield environments of today and tomorrow the Army needs to invest in human capital starting with the junior combat arms captain.

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Introduction

On April 11, 2003 my tank battalion had just completed seizing our battalion objectives when my Battalion Commander tasked me and the other Company Commanders to find all of the power plants, water treatment plants, and hospitals in our area of operation, a district known as Khadimiyah. Quickly, I tasked the soldiers of my company to start patrolling to find these essential facilities, and they did so quite successfully. I received a report that one of my platoons had located a sewage treatment plant along the Tigris River, and when I arrived at the plant I was relieved to find that the plant manager was still there and spoke decent English. I asked her what she needed to get the plant up and running. She gave me an extensive list of materials and chemicals she would need and asked for security since looters had already begun to steal anything of value from the plant. I asked what I thought was an obvious question: "Ma'am where did you get all of this stuff before?" She said "the government would just drop it off once a week, whether we needed it or not."

After about fifteen minutes I realized I was going to need some help. I gave the list of supplies to my battalion tactical operations center and waited for the agencies that were going to rebuild Iraq to arrive. After about two days with no word on the interagency cavalry's arrival, I had my epiphany; the only way the sewage plant and all the other essential services were going to get fixed was if we did it ourselves.

That's when I realized that I was an extraordinarily well-trained tank company commander for high intensity conflict, but I had no idea how to conduct stability operations, especially reconstruction. In order to fight and win today's conflicts, the Department of Army must develop an Army that is trained and, more importantly, educated to fight the full spectrum conflicts of today and tomorrow. The character of war has changed - it has now become a

decentralized fight with strategic implications, and this puts greater responsibility on company commanders, the captain. What has not changed is how the Army educates its junior officers for this new environment. In order to conduct full spectrum operations, the Army must leverage civilian graduate programs to educate its company grade combat arms officers in fields of study that will support stability operations. This paper will discuss the difference between training and educating and will evaluate how the Army currently trains its officer corps to determine whether this training will effectively prepare its junior officers for stability operations. This paper will propose recommendations to improve the Army's education program, and it will specifically address the need for an advanced civil schooling program for junior combat arms captains.

Training vs. Education

Army officers sometimes uses the words trained and educated interchangeably; however, these words have significantly different meanings. The Army defines training as, "the instruction of personnel to increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and associated individual and collective tasks."¹ Training prepares soldiers and leaders to operate in relatively certain conditions and focuses on "what to think."² Training is most frequently used when the goal is to prepare a leader or an organization to execute expected tasks. The small unit level process of "actions on contact" is an excellent example of the use of and need for training tasks in the Army. Actions on contact is a four step process that allows soldiers to react quickly when they come under enemy fire. Speed and precision are at a premium when in direct fire contact with the enemy. Training prepares soldiers for immediate execution of a particular process or procedure - it enables soldiers to rapidly apply existing solutions to well defined problems.

Education, conversely, prepares soldiers and leaders to operate in uncertain conditions and to deal with situations that may not have clear solutions. Education focuses on “how to think”, not just “what to think.”³ The Army defines education as, “instruction with increased knowledge, skill and/or experience as the desired outcome for the student.”⁴ While conducting stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army discovered that the number of complex problems its junior leaders have encountered have grown exponentially. Nation-building and security operations are exactly the situations that require leaders who know how to think. The current operating environment presents a plethora of complex problems with no clear solutions that require the leader to develop unique solutions to problems never before encountered. Additionally, the decision-maker needs to be prepared to alter his original solution as unexpected variables arrive. Numerous problems encountered in nation-building are resolved through methods beyond military solutions. Leaders must have the ability to use all of the instruments of national power to solve these complex problems. Currently we only educate these leaders to find military solutions to these problems.

Nation-Building

The Army conducts nation-building. The last few years in Afghanistan and Iraq have made this clear. The United States Government is beginning to see that World War II is more the exception to how the conducts nation-building operations and that nation-building in undeveloped countries is the rule. In the cases of Germany and Japan, these were two industrialized nations that had well educated populations and a cultural respect for the rule of law before the Allies began occupying their countries. Current and future wars will likely be fought in countries that are not industrialized, have had a history of unstable governments and poorly-

educated people. Even Iraq, which was touted as one of the most educated countries in the Middle East, fell into chaos after the despotic rule of Saddam was lifted. As globalization interconnects the industrialized nations even closer together, it becomes clearer that high intensity interstate wars between industrial nations will be few and far between. Conflicts will occur in and between countries that globalization has left behind and will challenge world security for the foreseeable future.⁵

The United States Government has agencies that conduct reconstruction activities (nation-building); however, they are too small to effectively handle any large scale nation-building. The Department of State has approximately 11,000 people in the Foreign Service tasked with implementing the foreign policy of the U.S in some 180 countries. Those people already have functions they must perform and cannot refocus their efforts on nation-building without ignoring current responsibilities.⁶ The Department of State has agency that is dedicated to nation-building U.S Agency for International Development (USAID); however, this organization is manned by about 3,000 people, many of whom never leave the U.S.⁷ These agencies have the staff with the education and skills to conduct nation-building operations but because of their limited size they will defer those nation-building activities to the military.

During the recent military surge in Iraq General Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), asked the State Department for a surge of its personnel as well. In response to General Petraeus' request for additional people the State Department sent an extra 250 experts to Iraq in order to stand up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The State Department had trouble coaxing enough employees to take positions on the PRT teams and had to use U.S. Army reservists to fill the bulk of the State Departments assigned PRT positions.

⁸ USAID and the State Department can surge enough people to advise nation-building for a

short duration; however, at current staffing levels they will never be able to conduct nation-building on the scale required in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, highlights the government's short comings with his assertion that, "The United States is ill equipped in its governmental structures to take on the nation-building mission, even when and where that is appropriate, since it does not have an operational arm proficient in nation-building in the way that it has a Department of Defense proficient in projecting military power."⁹

Only the Department of Defense (DOD) has enough deployable manpower to conduct and sustain large scale nation-building operations. (Army doctrine places the nation-building tasks under stability operations within full spectrum operations.) The Army is the DOD's force designed to remain on the ground for an extended period of time; therefore, the most appropriate force to assume the responsibility for nation-building is the Army. The Army must adapt to meet these new nation-building missions. An essential part of that adaptation is to change the way it educates its officers. The Army will be conducting stability operations for a long time to come. Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli sums this up best, saying "Another reality the uniformed forces must accept culturally is that, like it or not, until further notice the U.S. Government has decided that the military owns the job of nation-building."¹⁰ It is time that the Army recognizes that the task of nation-building is not going away and educates its leaders to meet the complex challenges this mission presents.

A Brief Overview of U.S. Involvement in Nation Building

Nation-building is not an entirely new phenomenon for the Army. The Army has been the USG's primary stability force since the Civil War. However, the leadership of the Army has

never embraced nation-building as an essential skill that should be trained for, even though it is a part of the operational concept of full spectrum operations. During the first few years of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, nation-building operations have not met the expectations of the local populations or the American people. The most significant progress in reconstruction has been made in the past two years as the leaders have received the on job training these operations have provided. The major change responsible for improving the situations in both countries was the embracing of a broad counterinsurgency mindset. This new conceptual approach was presented in the latest counterinsurgency doctrinal manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency with its focus on the population as the center of gravity. The publishing of FM 3-24 epitomizes the Army's change in focus and marks a cognitive paradigm shift in how the Army conducts its campaigns. Unfortunately, in the Army's quest to solve the political, economic, information, and social problems that are required to successfully fight an insurgency, the Army's expanded role has outrun its educational system.¹¹ The US Government's overreliance on the Army as the primary tool to accomplish U.S. foreign policy requires a transformation of the Army's education system.

Transformation?

The Army committed itself to the concept of transformation in October 1999. Then Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced the goal of reconfiguring the Army from a force mainly composed of heavy formations into a medium-weight force capable of deploying a 5,000-soldier brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours.¹² According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2003, this transformation is necessary in order to provide the President of the United States with a wider range of military options to dissuade aggression and

any form of coercion against the United States. The Army Transformation Roadmap describes how this transformation is necessary because of the evolving complex and uncertain 21st Century security environment. Army transformation consists of three components: transformation of Army culture, transformation of processes, and the development of inherently joint transformational capabilities. The Army has made changes in equipment and some organizations, but it has yet to make the cultural change in how it thinks about and educates its leaders for future wars. Retired Army Major General Robert Scales captures the Army's transformation best in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in 2004:

Transformation has been interpreted exclusively as a technological challenge. So far we have spent billions to gain a few additional meters of precision, knots of speed or bits of bandwidth. Some of that money might be better spent in improving how well our military thinks and studies war in an effort to create a parallel transformational universe based on cognition and cultural. War is a thinking man's game.¹³

Transformation has been sold as the most dramatic change in the history of the Army; however, the Army has failed to transform the way it educates its leaders for operations in the full spectrum of conflict in which they must operate.

Full Spectrum Operations: the Army's Operational Concept

Full spectrum operations is the Army's operational concept. The following is a description of how the Army's Field Manual 3-0 Operations (The Army's Keystone doctrinal manual) outlines how the Army will employ its forces using full spectrum operations:

The Army's operational concept is *full spectrum operations*. Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action –lethal and nonlethal- proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.¹⁴

The Army's preferred command and control method within full spectrum operations is through "mission command". Mission command is the conducting of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. Successful mission command requires that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, by acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander's intent. Mission command also demands that the commander conveys intent and possesses an appreciation of all aspects of the situation to allow for his *adaptive* use of military forces.¹⁵ In short, the operations manual has acknowledged that the Army's leaders of the future will have to adapt to a constantly changing situation. Figure 1 from FM 3-0 Operations lists all the subtasks of full spectrum operations.

<p style="text-align: center;">Offense</p> <p>Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement to contact • Attack • Exploitation • Pursuit <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces • Seize key terrain • Deprive the enemy of resources • Develop intelligence • Deceive and divert the enemy • Create a secure environment for stability operations 	<p style="text-align: center;">Defense</p> <p>Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile defense • Area defense • Retrograde <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations • Gain time • Achieve economy of force • Retain key terrain • Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure • Develop intelligence
<p style="text-align: center;">Stability</p> <p>Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil security • Civil control • Restore essential services • Support to governance • Support to economic and infrastructure development <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a secure environment • Secure land areas of the joint operations area • Meet the critical needs of the populace • Develop local capacity for security, economy, and rule of law • Gain support for host-nation government • Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success 	<p style="text-align: center;">Civil Support</p> <p>Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide support in response to disaster • Support civil law enforcement • Provide other support as required <p>Purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save lives • Restore essential services • Maintain or restore law and order • Protect infrastructure and property • Maintain or restore local government • Shape the environment for interagency success

Figure 1¹⁶

The Army is well trained in offensive and defensive operations; however, it has taken several years of conflict to become proficient in stability operations. Civil support tasks are similar to the stability tasks, but are specifically for operations within the United States. The Army has not traditionally trained nor educated its officers for the last three tasks of stability operations (restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development) principally because the Army did not embrace stability operations as an essential mission. Those units that have successfully conducted stability operations in Iraq have been led by visionary leaders. These visionary leaders had two things in common. They understood the situation and had advanced degrees from civilian institutions. Several of those leaders include: General David Petraeus (PhD Princeton), General Peter Chiarelli (PhD University of Texas), and LTC John Nagl (PhD Oxford). They have become household names because of the positive impact they have had in stability operations in Iraq. General Petraeus, as the Division Commander for the 101st Airborne, was the first division commander to transition into stability/nation-building operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Currently as the senior commander in Iraq he has improved the security situation by instituting the counterinsurgency methodology set forth in FM 3-24, the manual that he had a major role in writing. General Chiarelli was the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division during its occupation of Sadr City and was responsible for initiating a reconstruction campaign that resulted in an improved security situation.

The book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam served as a catalyst for change in the Army's senior leaders' approach to counterinsurgency operations. In Al Anbar, as battalion operations officer the author, LTC John Nagl was able to apply the counterinsurgency theories from his book. LTC Nagl returned from

Iraq to assist General Petraeus in writing FM 3-24.¹⁷ All of these leaders were given time to develop themselves through a graduate level education this helped transform them into officers that could look beyond military solutions to solve the complex problems they encountered in Iraq. Unlike Iraq, during future conflicts the Army may not have the luxury of time to figure out stability operations; therefore, it is imperative that the Army educates its leaders for the full spectrum wars of today and in the future

The Army's Professional Military Education Model

The Army's Professional Military Education system has failed to embrace full spectrum operations. The Army educates its leaders using the Army Training and Leader Development Model (ATLDM), which divides professional development into three domains: operational experience, self-development, and institutional training.

The first domain is the operational experience domain where officers develop the skills to operate in the force or the "real" Army. Officers develop these operational experiences while they are serving with line units during rotations to combat zones or Combat Training Center exercises. However, not all officers will have the same operational experiences and the other programs within the domain must compensate for these inequities. Those programs are the officer professional development (OPD) program and career counseling program. Battalion and company commanders are responsible for establishing these two leadership development programs within their units.

There is no set standard for these OPD programs and they are defined by battalion and company commanders based on their individual preferences and perceptions. There is little guidance from the Army on what skills or subjects should be addressed during OPDs in order to

tie operational experience to skills learned previously.¹⁸ Due to high operational tempo, most battalions do not execute an OPD program. Without a sound OPD program, officers do not get the holistic operational experience required for improving their officership.


Conversely the Army provides specific guidance to commanders and subordinates about how often individual performance/career counseling should be conducted and what should be discussed. But even with the structure of the individual counseling program, battalions and companies often fail to counsel junior officers according to the guidelines set forth. The counseling climate is set by the battalion commander. If he does not emphasize leader counseling, it does not happen. In an informal survey of 45 Maneuver Captains Career Course students (newly promoted captains), approximately 70% responded that their battalions had no OPD program and an equal number responded that they did not receive formal leader counseling from their commanders.¹⁹ This is the domain where the education of the junior officer begins; if educational process is not started the officer's development will be negatively affected.

The second domain, of the ATLDM is the self-development domain and it is arguably the weakest of the three domains. Like the OPD program, there are no specific guidelines or requirements placed on officers to encourage self development. The Chief of Staff of the Army publishes a reading list for officers, but that is the extent of the guidance on self-development. Officers are neither rewarded for pursuing the self development program, nor are they penalized for failing to do so.²⁰ It is likely that most junior officers don't know that self-development is a formal pillar of their development.²¹

The final domain of the ATLDM is the institutional training domain. The institutional domain is the most developed and structured of all the domains and is the core of the Army's Professional Military Education. This is the realm of the formal Army schools. Officers begin

their PME experience as lieutenants in the Basic Officer Leader Courses (BOLC). In BOLC lieutenants spend much of their time being trained to execute certain warfighting and administrative tasks. The focus is on training to make up for their lack of military experience. Once an officer becomes a captain he has gained enough operational experience to begin the transition to the educational part of his career. Currently, this will not start until the officer is a major.

Officers return to the institutional Army as newly promoted captains to attend career courses. At the career courses captains are trained to execute tactical processes and educated when and how to use those processes as company and battalion staff officers. As majors, they attend command and staff colleges, which are similar to the career courses, but with greater emphasis on education vice training. It isn't until an officer reaches the senior service colleges that the Army focuses their development on educating them to become adaptive, agile leaders; the military's version of the pentathlete. The institutional domain of ATLDM does an outstanding job of training junior officers for the offensive and defensive domains of full spectrum operations; however, it does not educate officers for stability operations. The institutional domain is neither designed for nor organized to properly educate officers in such critical stability subtasks as governance, essential service management and economics. Figure 2 depicts the transition between training and education during an officer's career progression.

Figure 2²²

Two of the three domains of Army's leader development, the operational experience domain and the self development domain, are not being used to their fullest extent. The majority of stability operations education takes place in these two domains. General Chiarelli, of the 1st Cavalry Division, offers an example of the operational experience domain working through his Division's pre-deployment training with the cities of Austin and Killeen, Texas. The Division's leadership learned how to manage essential services for the city. The 1st Cavalry Division took this experience with and knowledge of city services and used it to reduce insurgent attacks. For example the Division identified that neighborhoods that had essential services repaired or supplied saw a significant reduction in insurgent activity.²³ General Chiarelli credits much of his success in Iraq to the five years he spent earning his masters degree and teaching in the Social Sciences Department at the U.S. Military Academy.²⁴

The current threat recognizes the strengths of the U.S. military, but also perceives a potential weakness through waning public support. The Army begins each conflict with a disadvantage because it normally operates in someone else's country. A well-educated officer corps would be better suited to meet the challenges of an unfamiliar culture and be able to adapt to unforeseen problems more rapidly than just a well-trained officer. The requirement for junior leaders to be flexible and mentally agile is already upon the Army. The Army has placed combat arms officers in charge of town meetings, economic development, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, infrastructure repair, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and a multitude of training teams. All of these positions/roles require the ability to work in interagency, joint, coalition and foreign environments. In the past, these environments were reserved for senior officers who had twenty years to prepare for such roles. Each of these projects requires skills in social sciences, math, and hard sciences that have not been taught to officers by the institutional Army. The variety of roles that a junior officer must perform has grown considerably since the end of the Cold War. It is imperative that the Army's education system meet the educational needs these positions create.

The Strategic Captain

This dilemma is not new to the Army. For more than ten years, junior Army officers have been placed in ambiguous situations for which their training, and education left them under- if not un-, prepared. For instance, on August 28, 1997 in Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina, a U.S. Army captain was given the mission to secure a bridge, a critical terrain feature in at the epicenter of the three-way ethnic conflict in Bosnia. His mission was clearly tactical in nature: secure the bridge and do not allow it to fall into the hands of any of the ethnic factions.

Surrendering the bridge would give the side that controls the bridge a distinct advantage over its adversaries. Failure to hold the bridge could upset the tenuous peace that had recently been established and was being enforced by NATO forces. It could put the entire peacekeeping mission in jeopardy. Destroying the bridge to prevent its capture was not an option that would undermine the overall effort and the goal of economic reconstruction and development. During the mission, the company faced an angry crowd of 500-800 Serbian demonstrators who attacked the troops with stones, sticks, and Molotov cocktails. The company took several casualties but fired only warning shots into an abandoned building.²⁵ Though this was a tactical mission, it had significant strategic implications. In previous conflicts these types of situations were typically handled by field grade officers. The captain's inability to accomplish his assigned mission could lead directly to strategic failure.²⁶ The situation at the Brcko Bridge is a prime example of the level of responsibility that the Army has placed on its junior leaders. Add to this increased responsibility the "CNN effect" of the global mass media and the conditions have been set to create a junior officer whose decisions could very well have strategic consequences. The sound judgment of the company commander at the bridge prevented an incident that could have dramatically changed the U.S. military's strategic situation in Bosnia. Current and future full spectrum conflicts will require strategic captains. These captains need to be properly educated for this complex operational environment.

Company commanders are commanding soldiers in full spectrum operations daily. They make decisions that have strategic consequences. The Company Commander is also the lowest person in the chain of command who holds Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority over soldiers (e.g. the ability to charge and convict a soldier for misconduct within their command). A well-educated company commander will better understand the environment and

can be expected to not only make proper decisions but educate his soldiers to prevent strategic mistakes like Abu Ghraib. The commander will also likely possess the contextual awareness to preserve a key piece of infrastructure to facilitate a more rapid reconstruction of a nation.

The rank of captain is the lowest rank where the three domains of Army's Leader Development program intersect. Captains have gained the operational experience of serving in line units, have had some time for self-development, and have been trained in the institutional Army at least once. The captain is arguably in position to best affect the troops on the ground. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the counterinsurgency fights of the future hinge on tactical units due to the number of decisions that are made by junior leaders on the ground every day. Current doctrine directs captains to be the senior trainers of squads and to determine where and when to employ their squads. Captains also provide direct leadership to their companies as they are physically close enough to the squads to monitor and control their actions.

The Army has created positions that require junior officers to expand their understanding beyond offensive and defensive operations. The proliferation of combat arms officer assignments to Military Training Teams, Special Police Training Teams, Border Training Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and Human Terrain Teams have generated a requirement for junior officers to interact with multiple cultures, agencies, and diplomats. Just four years ago this operational environment was unheard of in the Army. The Army is placing a tremendous amount of responsibility on junior captains and majors that have not been educated to deal with the complexity and chaos that surrounds these kinds of assignments. A broader educational experience would provide these officers knowledge that would enable them to be more effective in the complex operational environments of today and of the future.

Full spectrum operations require officers to think strategically at the tactical level. Unfortunately the Army has not educated its junior captains to be strategic thinkers, nor has it adequately prepared them to operate in the complexity and chaos of the contemporary operational environment. The most effective way to do that is to detach the officer from the Army for a year and send him to a civilian institution to be educated in the disciplines required for stability operations.

The Army's Current Advanced Civil Schooling Programs

The Army already has several advanced civil schooling programs that place junior officers in civilian universities for one or two years (program dependent) to earn an advanced degree in return for an additional service obligation. The first program is the Advanced Civil Schooling Program that sends combat support and combat service support officers to civilian institutions to receive advance degrees in their respective Army career fields, e.g. Army comptrollers attend a civilian university to earn a masters degree in accounting. The degrees that these officers receive are technical in nature and are related to technical career fields. This program does set precedents for educating officers in civilian universities; however, it does not address the Army's need to educate its company grade combat arms officers.

Currently there are only three ways a combat arms captain can earn a government funded advanced degree from a civilian university. The first way is through the highly selective and extremely limited Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) internship program. The second option is to accept an equally selective teaching position at the United States Military Academy. The third way is to through the Army's new retention incentive called the Expanded Graduate School Program.

The JCS internship sends approximately twenty senior captains to Georgetown University for a year to earn an Executive Masters in Policy Management. Those officers are then required to spend a year on the Joint Staff and a year on the Army Staff. This utilization tour takes them out of the deployable force for three years. Additionally, the internship is only open to post-command captains, who are too senior to use their skills at the company grade level.

The West Point Instructor option has similar impacts as the JCS program since it can take combat arms officers out of the line for a minimum of four and typically five years. Officers selected for the program spend up to two years at a civilian university in order to earn a master's degree in the field of study they will be teaching, and then spend an additional three years at the United States Military Academy as an instructor. This program is also restricted to post-command captains and has similar restraints as the JCS program. Furthermore, this program is open to all branches of the Army, so only a relative number of combat arms officers are accepted into this program.

The third path to advance civil schooling is through the Expanded Graduate School Program (EGSP). In 2006 the Army's Human Resources Command (HRC) began offering the opportunity to utilize the Army's Advance Civil Schooling program to officers of any branch as a retention incentive. This program provides the officer with the ability to receive a fully funded graduate degree from an approved civilian university in exchange for an additional service obligation. The program accepted 182 officers in fiscal year 2007 and of those officers; only 42 were combat arms officers.²⁷ So out of approximately 800 eligible combat arms officers the Army is only sending 42 volunteers, dramatically missing this opportunity to meet, the modern battlefield demands for a better educated junior officer.

Because of the JCS program's and the academy's length of commitment (normally three years), small numbers, and few positions, these two options are too restrictive paths to graduate degrees for the majority of combat arms officers. The EGSP does offer an opportunity for qualified officers to attend a graduate school; however, the Army's current culture does encourage officers to attend graduate school for 12 to 18 months. The EGSP highlights a willingness by the Army to fund a graduate program for company grade officers. Unfortunately the Army has not fostered a cultural awareness of how important graduate education is for combat arms officers.

Educate Leaders to Operate in the Uncertainty of Full Spectrum Operations

There are numerous benefits of sending junior captains to earn advanced degrees. First, by investing in future leaders early, the Army is allowing the junior captains to use their newly acquired skills in a timely manner. This would enable commanders to use creative solutions, thus benefiting both the U.S. Government and the foreign populace being engaged. The additional time in academia will also strengthen communication skills and allow officers to more effectively communicate with superiors, subordinates, peers, and the media. This would facilitate better information operations at the lowest levels of war, something that has been proven to be necessary when fighting a counterinsurgency.

The investment in education would also reinforce the importance of life-long learning that the Army Leader Development program purports, in the self-development domain. Programming a year of graduate education early in the officer's career progression would institutionally show a commitment to dramatically enhancing the officer's self-development program and commitment to life-long learning. The Army's Field Manual 3-24

Counterinsurgency begins chapter one with the following quote “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare -it is the graduate level of war.”²⁸ If the Army truly believes this, then the Army needs to arm its officers with a graduate education to fight counterinsurgencies as well as operating within the rest of the spectrum of operations.

Recommendation

The Army must transform the career progression of its company grade officers to send the majority of junior combat arms captains to civilian institutions for advanced degrees. These degrees should focus on disciplines that will support the expeditionary Army’s full spectrum mission.²⁹ This one-year investment in human capital will provide the needed skills for the Army’s current fight, as well as future conflicts. For too long the Army has viewed soldiers as an overhead expense, not a source of investment.³⁰ It is time to change this view.

Company grade combat arms officers are the most obvious symbol of the United States in conflict zones. These officers are the ones who interact with the local populace on a daily basis and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. Unfortunately, these officers have fewer opportunities for Army funded graduate education than the support branches. Advanced civil schooling would provide opportunities for combat arms officers to receive education they would not otherwise receive unless they switched branches within the Army, changed their career field or removed themselves from the operational force for an extended period. None of these choices allow them to return to their original combat arms branch or apply their newly acquired skills on the battlefield at the company grade level.

A career path programmed year of graduate school would also be a retention incentive for young officers. Retention has become such an issue that the Army is offering \$35,000 to infantry and artillery officers to stay in the Army for an additional three years.³¹ The expanded graduate school program is already used as a retention tool. The Army has a major retention problem with its junior officers. In 2006, 44% of West Point graduates from 2001 resigned their commissions upon completion of their initial service obligation.³² Advanced civil schooling would also prevent young officers from 'burning out' too early in their careers. The time devoted to advanced civil schooling would provide a year of stability to the officers and their families. Programmed deployment breaks allow for officers and their families to get through long deployments because they may feel assured of breaks in their future. A lack of stability has negative cascading effects on soldiers and their families. A year of self-development would provide officers the time to reinvest in their families, which will pay dividends when the Army deploys them for up to fifteen months to Iraq. The one-year educational investment in human capital by the Army would be a sound investment for the Army's future.

Sending officers to civilian graduate schools would also reconnect officers to the society they have sworn to defend. With less than 1% of the nation's population serving in the military, there is a perception that the military is becoming disconnected with the American people. As veterans retire from politics, the number of politicians who have served in the military is growing smaller and smaller. This means that policy makers have trouble relating to the military. Thus, the military needs to make an effort to reconnect to society, including political leadership. The officers would also educate the public on the role of the Army. This would be akin to a public affairs operation aiding the recruitment of American citizens who would not otherwise be familiar with the Army.

The captains that are in funded graduate programs could also be used to mentor cadets in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. Currently, most ROTC programs have contractors as instructors. These contractors are former commissioned or non-commissioned officers, but are usually ten or more years older than the cadets and cannot relate as easily to college students as an officer who graduated only four years ago.³³

The benefits of sending junior captains to a year of graduate school are clear. It is time for the Army to embrace education as the key to preparing for future ambiguous conflicts. Implementation through the Army's Professional Education Model will not require a radical change in funding or manning. If it is implemented incrementally, the impact on the operational force would be minimal. This would enable the Army to get stronger for current and future operations. The Army should plan officers' careers as it would a campaign and fight to manage it well.

Notes

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Battle Focused Training, Field Manual 7-1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2003), Glossary 22.

² Colonel Robert A. Tipton, "Professional Military Education for the "Pentathlete" of the Future," (U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2006), 3.

³ Harvey and Schoomaker, *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2005*, 1.

⁴ FM 7-1, Glossary 15.

⁵ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty First Century* (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), 4.

⁶ Lieutenant General Peter W., Chiarelli and Major Stephen M. Smith, "Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future," *Military Review* LXXXVI, no.5 (September-October 2007): 5

⁷ Chiarelli and Smith, 5.

⁸ Howard LaFranchi, "US civilians drive Iraq's other surge", *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 12, 2007, 1.

⁹ Delia K. Cabe "Nation Building: Shedding its isolationist stance, the United States begins reaching out to its global neighbors" *Kennedy School Bulletin*, Spring 2002.

¹⁰ http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgpress/bulletin/spring2002/features/nation_building.html (accessed January 20, 2008).

¹¹ Chiarelli and Smith, 5.

¹² Jeffery D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army," *Parameters*, (Autumn 2001), 18.

¹³ Army Transformation Roadmap 2003

¹⁴ Major General(Retired) Robert Scales, Testimony to the House Committee on Armed Services,

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, February 08), 3-1.

¹⁶ FM 3-0, 3-1.

¹⁷ FM 3-0, 3-7.

¹⁸ Fred Kaplan, "Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass", *Slate*, 12 Oct 2007, <http://www.slate.com> (Accessed 16 Oct 2007).

¹⁹ Tipton, 5-6.

²⁰ As an instructor at the Maneuver Career Captains Course from 2005 thru 2007 I conducted an informal survey at the beginning of every 100 day course on the type of leader development Lieutenants and Captains were receiving in the force. My personal experience was that only one of my six battalion commanders had a functioning OPD program in place.

²¹ Tipton, 5-6.

²² Based on my informal survey at the career course

²³ McCausland and Martin, 22.

²⁴ Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, "Winning the Peace The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations," *Military Review* LXXXV, no. 5 (July-August 2005): 6.

²⁵ Chiarelli and Smith, 13.

²⁶ In the spring of 1998 during my Squadron's SFOR Mission Readiness Exercise "Mountain Eagle" at the Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center we were brief by the company commander of the company that secured the bridge at Brcko.

²⁷ McCausland and Martin, 17.

²⁸ HRC website

²⁹ FM 3-24, 1-1.

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, The Army, Field Manual, 1-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2005), FM 1-0

³¹ Scales

³² US Army Human Resources Command MILPER MESSAGE NUMBER : 07-237

AHRC-OPL-R IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMY OFFICER MENU OF INCENTIVES PROGRAM (REGULAR ARMY) <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/milpermsgs.nsf>

³³ Fred Kaplan, "An Officer and a Family Man: Why is the Army losing so many talented midlevel officers?" *Slate* (16 January 2008), <http://www.slate.com> (accessed 17 January 2008).

³³ <http://www.goarmyrotc.com/>

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